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Abstract 
There has been a lot of outcry from the public that Zambia’s mineral tax reforms with an aim to optimize 
revenue benefits from the mines have not yielded the desired results. This has mainly been attributed to the 
weak design of its legislated mineral fiscal systems. Due to this underlying reason, this research aims at 
undertaking an economic appraisal of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes with an objective of assessing their 
robustness so as to ultimately determine that which is sturdiest in design. This research brings forward a well 
compiled methodology of evaluating mineral fiscal regimes. It also possess the potential of acting as a future 
reference of optimizing Zambia’s mineral taxation where the most robust tax structure can act as a starting point 
in the optimization process. The appraisal used Lumwana Mine as case study and encapsulated five evaluation 
criterions. These include neutrality, progressivity, revenue raising potential, government risk and investor 
perception of risk. These measures have been selected as a criteria for evaluation because they best capture and 
explain the revenue generating objective of a taxation regime.  The economic appraisal framework employs 
spreadsheet modeling techniques and was anchored on two state of affairs which include the status quo and 
worst case scenario. Overall results indicate that Zambia’s mineral taxation systems except the 2008 regime are 
relatively robust in capturing mining revenue. It can be concluded that it is not a single tax that affects a mineral 
fiscal regime but the lump sum of all taxes and how they harmonize with each other. The study recommends 
that the government should review and optimize the current mineral taxation system as it is the most robust in 
design. Additionally, the government must increase the institutional capacity of Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA).   
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1. Introduction  
Zambia has a high level of macroeconomic dependence on mining. This makes it prone to financial risk 
emanating from the stochastic behavior of copper prices on the international market. The mining sector in 
Zambia is the mainstay of the economy and accounts for over 11% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 80% of 
foreign exchange earnings and over 60,000 direct jobs. Despite these positive externalities the public still claims 
that mining benefits have not trickled down to the common citizen. This has incited the public to mount pressure 
on the Zambian Government claiming that the country is not extracting the maximum revenue benefits from the 
mines. This has been attributed to the weak design of its legislated mineral fiscal regimes [1]. Due to this 
underlying reason, the research paper aims at undertaking an economic appraisal of Zambia’s mineral taxation 
regimes with an objective of assessing their robustness so as to ultimately determine that which is sturdiest in 
design. The appraisal used Lumwana Mine as case study and was based on five criterions which include 
neutrality, government risk, investor perception of risk, revenue raising potential and progressivity.  
Zambia has undergone a transition of six mineral tax reforms since the privatization of its mines in 1997 and 
2000. These include (Amended from Manley [2]): 
• The Development Agreements (DA): These were agreements signed with individual mines at 
privatization (i.e. 1997 to 2000); 
• The 2008 tax regime: Tax regime used from April 2008 to March 2009; 
• The 2009 tax regime: Tax regime used from April 2009 to March 2012; 
• The 2012 tax regime: Tax regime used from April 2012 to December 2014; 
• The 2015 tax regime: Tax regime used from January 2015 to June 2015; and 
• The Post-2015 tax regime: Tax regime used since July 2015 till date. 
The key features of  Zambia’s mining taxation regimes have been depicted in Table 1. 
1.1. Limitations of the Research 
This research focuses on the evaluation of five mineral taxation regimes (i.e. 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015 and      
Post-2015 tax system). It does not undertake an evaluation of the DA tax system. This is because in the DA era 
different mines were provided with different mining fiscal regimes by the Zambian Government and the 
structure of these regimes have not been made available to the public for scrutiny due to confidentiality reasons. 
This means that the individualized Lumwana mining tax agreement signed at privatization with the government 
has not been disseminated to the public for evaluation purposes. Additionally, the research study encapsulates 
direct taxes only. This is because indirect taxes are difficult to analyze due to their multiple exemptions and 
rates provided to the mines by the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). Lastly, this research solely focuses on the 
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copper mining sector. 
Table 1: Key features of Zambia’s mining fiscal regimes 
Type of Tax DA 2008 2009 2012 2015 POST-2015 
 
Profit based tax 
 
Company income tax (% of profit base)  
Mineral processing and tolling (%) 35 35 35 35 30 35 
Mining operations (%) 25 30 30 30 0 30 
 
Variable Profit Tax (VPT) in effect? 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Industrial   
minerals 
 
Yes 
 
Profit tax base details 
 
Capital depreciation allowance 100 25 100 25 25 25 
Loss carry forward (maximum years) 5-10 10 10 10 10 10 
Allowed debt to equity ratio 2:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 3:1 3:1 
Revenue tax types  
Mineral royalty [ad 
valorem] (%) 
Underground Mining 0.6 3 3 6 8 6 
Open cast Mining 0.6 3 3 6 20 9 
Windfall tax in effect? No Yes No No No No 
Other tax types  
Customs duty Exempted in most cases 
Export duty (on copper anodes) No 15% but with some waivers 
 
1.2. Background Theory 
Most of the literature on mineral tax evaluation revolves around six evaluation measures. These include 
neutrality, progressivity, revenue raising potential, risk, administrative efficiency and economic allocative 
efficiency. 
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a) Neutrality 
Several authors including Baunsgaard [3], Nakhle [4], and Daniel et al. [5] have described a neutral tax as one 
that leaves the pre-tax ranking of a project equal to its post-tax ranking. If project X is more attractive than 
project Y before tax is legislated, it should remain so after tax is implemented [6]. Guj [7] describes neutrality of 
a tax in terms of economic allocative efficiency as one that promotes the reallocation of resources to their most 
optimal use for the continued production of goods and services. In the mining sector, a neutral tax is defined as 
that which does not change an investor’s decision relating to production and development of projects. Taxes 
offer a tradeoff between neutrality and other standard measures of taxation. For example, a tax that is neutral on 
one hand may not necessary be administrative efficient on the other e.g. Corporate Income Tax (CIT). 
b) Progressivity 
A progressive tax regime can be defined as one that maximizes government take in a company’s pre-tax cash 
flows at higher profitability and at the same time minimizes this take at lower profitability. Similarly, 
Mohammed [8] describes a tax regime that is progressive as one that increases government take when the rate of 
return is high and gives financial relief to investors when the rate of return is low. A tax regime that is adaptable 
to realized profits is deemed to be stable by the investor [5]. A fiscal regime that promotes stability is able to 
adjust both to high and low profits without adversely affecting a projects profit or pressuring governments to 
unilaterally alter the fiscal terms [9]. This means a progressive tax regime has a lower bearing on investor 
perception of risk. Notwithstanding these benefits, progressive tax regimes affect many factors including 
investment incentives and distribution of risk between mining companies and the Host State (HS) [10]. 
c) Revenue Raising Potential 
A government can capture economic rent by taxing the mineral sector as much as possible but this must be 
consistent with the need to attract and retain investment. However, Daniel et al. [5] argues that it is difficult to 
tax economic rent satisfactorily because of the following reasons: 
• Inaccurate estimation of the economic rent base; 
• Possible presence of quasi-rents; and 
• Continued demand for incentives by mining companies to fuel their operations. 
Like any other tax evaluation measure, revenue raising potential affects other canons of taxation including 
neutrality, progressivity and investor perception of risk. Appiah [11] notes that there are few developing 
countries that can adopt tax reforms that offer great loss in revenue no matter how desirable they can be from 
other perspectives. 
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d) Risk 
Risk is a source of worry both to the mineral investor and the HS. In order to instigate a win-win situation 
between the two parties the HS must design mineral policies that advocate for equal risk sharing. However, 
accomplishing this is no easy task. 
Mineral prices are highly stochastic and as a consequence so is the revenue inflow to the mining project [7]. 
Low revenue inflow to the mining investor translates in high government risk.  
Mining is a risky venture, due to this reason, mine owners are always in constant fear of project failure. Risks 
faced by mining owners include long payback period before initial investment is recouped, volatile mineral 
prices and difficulties encountered in envisaging political, economic and technical problems. Taking into 
consideration the intensity of capital injected into mining activities, it is only rational for mine owners to be risk 
averse. To the contrary, most governments are risk neutral. This is because of docile equity participation in 
mining activities. However, those dependent on just a few projects tend to be risk averse. 
e) Administrative Efficiency 
An administrative efficient tax regime signifies that which generates low compliance costs between the 
government and the tax payer. To attain this, host governments must implement mineral tax policies that are 
administratively clear. This means that tax policies should be simple and easily understood by the common tax 
payer. Complicated tax regimes usually result in low administrative efficiency, it is for this reason why most 
industrialized mineral economies advocate for the implementation of tax instruments that are based on simple 
formulations. 
f) Economic Allocative Efficiency 
An economically efficient tax regime is one that promotes redistribution of resources of the economy to their 
most productive use to produce the ever-changing mix of goods and services that the society requires and at the 
lowest possible unit cost [7]. In the mining context, an economic allocative efficient tax is one that does not 
distort an investor’s decisions concerning exploration, development and exploitation of a mineral resource. In 
taxation, there is usually a tradeoff between administrative efficiency and economic allocative efficiency. This 
means that a tax that is economic allocative efficient might not be administrative efficient on the other hand. For 
instance, an ad valorem royalty has high administrative efficiency but a low degree of economic allocative 
efficiency. To the contrary, a profit based tax has a high degree of economic allocative efficiency but low 
administrative efficiency. Thus, a tax regime that employs both tax instruments possess a high probability of 
balancing the two measures than that based on a single tax component. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Software Application 
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Microsoft Excel was used to simulate different evaluation results. This was chosen as the most suitable software 
for application because it provides a cheap and easy platform for undertaking spreadsheet modeling on which 
this research was based. 
2.2. Data Collection 
For the purpose of this study, both primary and secondary data have been used. The primary data has been 
collected from government national speeches, electronic mail and government documents. The secondary data, 
on the other hand, has been collected from textbooks borrowed from public libraries and from journal and 
research articles collected from World Wide Web sites. 
2.3. Lumwana Mine Profile 
Lumwana Mine project owned by Barrick Gold Corporation was used as a case study in this research. This mine 
is situated in the North Western region of Zambia, 220 km west of the Copperbelt province and 65 km west of 
the town of Solwezi. The mine is a multi-pit, multi staged operation mining approximately 139 Mt of ore and 
waste per annum and producing copper concentrates containing an average of 140,000 tonnes of copper metal 
per year over a thirty-seven (37) year mine life. This makes Lumwana Mine the largest single open cut copper 
mine in Africa. The mining license covers 1,355 km² and includes two major copper deposits, Malundwe and 
Chimiwungo, as well as 25 exploration prospects. The license is valid for 25 years (from January 2004) and is 
renewable for a further 25 years. The construction of the mine started in late 2006, and was carried out by 4,700 
workers. Injected construction cost amounted to approximately $760 million. 
2.4. Framework of Economic Appraisal  
This sub-section presents an in-depth review of the quantitative methodological set up used to undertake an 
economic appraisal of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes. 
a) Test for Revenue Raising Potential 
The revenue raising potential of each mineral fiscal regime was measured using single case time profile graphs 
of revenue based on the status quo and worst case scenario. Table 2 shows the price fluctuation percentages 
associated with these two scenarios. Under this criterion, the status quo scenario asserts the current status of 
forecasted copper prices whilst the worst case scenario asserts adverse price conditions. 
Table 2: Price fluctuations for revenue raising test 
Scenario Status quo scenario Worst case scenario 
Price Fluctuation Percentages 
 
0 
 
-20 
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b) Test for Progressivity 
Progressivity of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes was analyzed by comparing the governments take in the pre-
tax cash flows of the mining company (i.e. Average Effective Tax Rate (AETR)) over a range of pre-tax Net 
Present Values (NPVs). The various AETRs and pre-tax NPVs were generated by exclusively fluctuating the 
yearly copper prices over the forecasted years. This evaluation criterion was examined using a scenario analysis. 
Two scenarios were adopted for examination. These include the status quo and worst case scenario. The status 
quo scenario under this indicator asserts a situation of the current status of risk. Conversely, the worst case 
scenario asserts a situation of high risk. The risk factor has been encapsulated in the discount rate (i.e. a high 
discount rate to mean high risk). The worst case discount rate has been obtained by adding 3 percentage points 
to the status quo discount rate. The added 3 percentage points represent increased risk. Table 3 depicts the 
discount rates associated with these two scenarios. 
Table 3: Discount rates for progressivity test 
 
Discount rates 
Status quo scenario (%) Worst case scenario (%) 
Government of Zambia (GRZ) 8 11 
Lumwana Mine 15 18 
 
c) Test for Neutrality 
Neutrality was examined using three fundamental indicators; namely AETR, Marginal Effective Tax Rate 
(METR) and a comparability analysis of pre- to post tax Internal Rate of Return (IRR). These indicators were 
evaluated based on the status quo and worst case scenario. 
i) Average Effective Tax Rate (AETR) 
The AETR can be defined as a ratio of the NPV of tax payments at government’s discount rate to the NPV of a 
company’s pre-tax cash flows at the mining firm’s discount rate. Equation 1 has been employed to calculate the 
AETR. 
 ET    
     
     
          (1) 
Where, NPVG is the NPV of tax payments at government status quo discount rate ($); and NPVM is the NPV of 
a company’s pre-tax cash flows at a mining firm’s status quo cost of capital ($).   tax regime which generates a 
high AETR asserts that which has a high degree of non-neutrality and vice versa. 
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ii) Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) 
Daniel et al. [5] describes METR as unity less the ratio of post-tax IRR to pre-tax IRR. Equation 2 shows the 
calculation of METR. 
     [  
            
           
]          (2) 
A taxation regime yielding a large value of METR asserts one which has a high degree of non-neutrality and 
vice versa. 
iii) Comparability analysis of pre- to post-tax IRR 
A comparability analysis of pre- to post-tax IRR was undertaken. A tax system yielding a small difference 
between pre- and post-tax IRR is termed to have a high degree of neutrality. Conversely, a tax regime yielding a 
large difference between these parameters has a high degree of non-neutrality. 
These three indicators of neutrality were evaluated on the basis of the status quo and worst case scenario shown 
in Table 4. The worst case scenario asserts a situation of adverse price conditions whilst the status quo scenario 
reflects an unbiased (i.e. current status) forecast of copper prices. 
Table 4: Price fluctuation percentages for neutrality test 
Scenario Status quo scenario Worst case scenario 
Price Fluctuation Percentages 
 
0 
 
-15 
 
d) Test for Investor Perception of Risk 
The investor perception of risk of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes was evaluated by analyzing the cumulative 
probability distribution of post-tax NPV of Lumwana Mine discounted at 15% and 18%. These discount rates 
represent the status quo and worst case scenario. Under this criterion, the status quo scenario signifies the 
current state of risk as reflected by the use of a low discount rate whilst the worst case scenario asserts a state of 
adverse risk as reflected by the use of a high discount rate. Different values of post-tax NPV were generated by 
undertaking a series of price fluctuations. Therefore, this criterion assumes price to be the only source of 
uncertainty or risk. 
e) Test for Government Risk 
The uncertainty of revenue inflow is a source of worry to mineral dependent economies. This has called for the 
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development of mineral fiscal tools to combat this risk. The Coefficient of Variation (CV) parameter has been 
used as a measure of risk in this research study. A taxation regime yielding the lowest value of CV of 
government revenue (i.e. NPV of tax revenue) reduces the host state’s exposure to risk because it limits the 
dispersion of revenue inflow. Different NPV values were obtained by solely fluctuating the yearly forecasted 
real copper prices. Table 3 shows the government discount rates that have been employed in evaluating this 
criterion based on the status quo and worst case scenario. Under this criterion, the status quo scenario signifies 
the current state of risk as reflected by the use of a low discount rate whilst the worst case scenario asserts a 
state of adverse risk as reflected by the use of a high discount rate. 
2.5.  Justification of Evaluation Criteria 
The evaluation process of this research has employed five criterions which include neutrality, progressivity, 
revenue raising potential, government risk and investor perception of risk. These measures have been selected as 
a criteria of evaluation because they best explain and encapsulate the revenue generating objective of a tax 
regime. However, it must be mentioned that other important evaluation measures exist including international 
competitiveness, administrative efficiency and susceptibility of taxation regimes to tax planning schemes. These 
measures require an in-depth analysis and are thus beyond the scope of this research. 
3. Results and Discussion 
This section gives an analysis of the data gathered. It also undertakes a critical discussion of the results. Firstly, 
it gives an elaborate explanation of the spreadsheet modeling process of the case study mine. It ends with a 
thorough discussion on appraisal results.  
3.1. Results of Spreadsheet Modeling 
Spreadsheet modelling was adopted to estimate Discounted Cash Flows (DCFs) of the Lumwana mining project 
under Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes. Table 5 shows the forecast of key parameters of the Lumwana Mine 
project. 
a) Forecast of Copper Prices 
The World Bank [13] real price forecast was used to determine the prices of copper at different points in time. 
b) Forecast of Production 
A linear regression production forecasting model for Lumwana Mine was developed using Microsoft Excel. Past 
copper prices were plotted against past copper ore production values with an aim of determining a relationship 
between the two variables. Figure 1 depicts the graphical representation of the linear production forecasting 
model.   
The linear production forecasting model in Figure 1 can be written as Equation 3. 
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Table 5: Forecast of parameters for Lumwana Mine project 
FORECASTED LUMWANA MINE MODEL 
 
Year Units 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
Copper 
prices 
$/t 6451 6351 6225 6158 6059 5960 5860 5761 5663 5566 5470 
Ore 
production 
Kt 15880 15827 15774 15720 15667 15614 15560 15507 15454 15400 15346 
Operating 
cost 
$M 
332.6
7 
331.5
5 
330.4
3 
329.3
2 
328.2
0 
327.0
8 
325.9
6 
324.8
5 
323.7
3 
322.6
1 
321.49 
Capital 
expenditure 
$M 33.27 33.16 33.04 32.93 32.82 32.71 32.60 32.48 32.37 32.26 32.15 
 
Other key parameters 
1. Average mill grade = 0.75% 
2. Average mill recovery = 85.1% 
3. Percentage of paid copper at the smelter = 96.5% 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the linear production forecasting model 
        ( )            (3) 
Where, CPn is the nominal copper price ($/t) obtained from the World Bank [13] price forecast and P is the 
copper ore production (Kt). Rearranging Equation 3 gives: 
      (   )               (4) 
Y = 0.15X + 4,501.37 
R² = 0.72 
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c) Forecast of Operating Cost and Capital Expenditure 
To forecast operating cost the average unit operating expenditure has been adopted for application. Yearly 
capital expenditure was assumed to be 10% of yearly operating cost. This assumption conforms to Zambia’s 
Ministry of Mine’s methodology of determining capital expenditure.  This assumption was made because data 
was not made readily available by the revenue authority because of confidentiality reasons. 
d) Cost of Capital 
An appropriate status quo cost of capital had to be selected for the case study mine and GRZ. A status quo real 
discount rate of 15% has been applied for Lumwana Mine. However, for the case of the Zambian Government a 
risk free rate has been adopted for application. This is because the Zambian Government owns passive equity 
and thus does not actively participate in the risk faced by the investor. Zambia has a market risk premium of 
6.6% [12]. The difference between this market risk premium and the Lumwana Mine cost of capital of 15% 
gives the risk free rate to be applied for the case of Zambia. Thus, 8% has been adopted as a reasonable status 
quo discount rate to be applied for government’s assessment. However, a scenario analysis can always be 
undertaken to examine the effects of different discount rates. 
3.2. Results of Economic Appraisal  
This section presents the evaluation results in terms of neutrality, revenue raising potential, investor perception 
of risk, government risk and progressivity based on the status quo and worst case scenario. 
a) Results of Revenue Raising Test  
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Figure 2: Results of revenue raising test 
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The revenue raising potential of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes has been analyzed using time profile graphs 
of revenue based on the status quo and worst case scenario. Figure 2 depicts the graphical representation of the 
forecasted government revenue in a span of 10 years (2015-2025). 
The revenue raising pattern of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes in Figure 2 reflects the World Bank real 
copper price forecast employed in this study. In this case, both the copper price forecast and the revenue raising 
pattern (i.e. on the side of government) exhibit a downward trend. Thus, it’s suffice to say that the revenue 
raising profile has mainly been determined by the copper price forecast. Production has no counter effect on this 
revenue raising pattern because it too solely uses price as a forecasting parameter thus conforming to its 
plunging tendency. 
Under the worst case scenario, it can be deduced that the 2015 taxation regime has the highest revenue raising 
potential. This is because it begins to generate revenue above that which is generated by each individual taxation 
regime beyond 2023. This pattern is bound to continue as long as copper prices continue to plummet. These 
results ascertain that mineral royalty extracts a fairly substantial amount of revenue for the government in times 
of low mineral prices (i.e. low business profit). 
b) Results of Progressivity Test 
Progressivity of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes was analyzed by comparing the governments take in pre-tax 
cash flows of Lumwana Mine (AETR) over a range of pre-tax NPVs. The variation in AETR and pre-tax NPV 
(reflecting project profitability) was generated by solely varying the forecasted copper prices. Figure 3 shows 
the results of the progressivity test. The AETR in Figure 3 represents the share of government revenue in pre-tax 
cash flows of Lumwana Mine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Results of progressivity test 
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It should be noted that there is a disadvantage of using the AETR as a measure of profitability. This 
disadvantage is that the AETR masks the relative progressivity of taxation regimes when presented graphically 
[5]. 
“Progressivity” here means that the capacity of a taxation regime ensures that the government receives a rising 
share of project cash flows as the intrinsic profitability of the project increases. Figure 3 under both scenarios 
shows that all taxation regimes move in tandem as the pre-tax NPV just starts to increase. This suggests that all 
trigger similar changes in government take at lower profitability. However, as the pre-tax NPV continues to 
increase, the progressivity graphs of the Post-2015, 2012 and 2009 taxation regimes coincide and are above 
those generated by the 2008 and 2015 regime. This signifies that the Post-2015, 2012 and 2009 taxation systems 
grant higher take than the 2008 and 2015 regimes at higher profitability. 
The coinciding of the Post-2015, 2012 and 2009 graphs in Figure 3 asserts that the three tax regimes have the 
same level of progressivity. This ranking is followed by a sequential ranking of the 2008 and 2015 regime as 
reflected in Figure 3. From these results, it can be concluded that hybridized mineral tax regimes (i.e. 2008, 
2009, 2012 and Post-2015 regimes) are more progressive than single tier taxation system based on mineral 
royalty (i.e. 2015 regime). 
c) Results of Neutrality Test 
Neutrality of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes has been examined using three fundamental indicators, namely; 
AETR, METR and a comparability analysis of pre- to post-tax IRR. Table 6 shows the neutrality results of these 
three indicators based on the status quo and worst case scenario. 
A tax system that generates lowest values of AETR and METR asserts one which has a high degree of 
neutrality. Similarly, a tax regime that yields a small difference between pre- and post-tax IRR signifies that 
which has a high degree of neutrality. Under both scenarios (i.e. worst case and status quo), the 2008 tax regime 
can be ranked as the most neutral followed by a sequential ranking of the 2015, 2009, 2012 and lastly Post-2015 
regime. This ranking profile shows that the 2009 regime ranks higher in neutrality than the 2012 and Post-2015 
regime. This can be attributed to its low mineral royalty rate. Similarly, the 2012 tax system ranks higher than 
the Post-2015 regime because the former has a lower royalty rate than the latter. These results highlight that 
mineral royalty (i.e. Ad valorem) has a high degree of non-neutrality. This means that all things being equal an 
increase in the royalty rate results in decreased neutrality of the taxation regime as a whole. 
d) Results of Government Risk Test 
Government is more concerned with the stability of revenue inflow from the mineral sector. This volatility has 
been used as surrogate measure of risk. The Coefficient of Variation (CV) parameter has been employed to 
measure this volatility. Table 7 shows the results of the government risk test. Different NPV values were 
generated using a range of different price sensitivities.  
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Table 6: Results of neutrality test 
STATUS QUO SCENARIO 
 
INDICATOR 
MINERAL TAXATION REGIME 
2008 2009 2012 2015 POST 2015 
Average effective tax rate (%) 59 113 115 70 118 
Marginal effective tax rate (%) 47 86 88 49 90 
Pre-tax IRR (%) 261 261 261 261 261 
Post-tax IRR (%) 139 37 31 133 25 
Difference between pre-tax IRR and post-tax IRR (%) 122 224 230 128 236 
 
WORST CASE SCENARIO 
 
INDICATOR 
MINERAL TAXATION REGIME 
2008 2009 2012 2015 POST 2015 
Average effective tax rate (%) 65 117 120 85 123 
Marginal effective tax rate (%) 52 92 95 60 100 
Pre-tax IRR (%) 197 197 197 197 197 
Post-tax IRR (%) 95 16 9 79 0.1 
Difference between pre-tax IRR and post-tax IRR (%) 102 181 188 118 197 
Table 7: Results of government risk test 
STATUS QUO SCENARIO 
 
INDICATOR 
MINERAL TAXATION REGIME 
2008 2009 2012 2015 POST-2015 
Standard Deviation ($ Million) 403.88 938.12 947.42 251.64 956.85 
Mean NPV ($ Million) 1574.56 3355.87 3407.37 1371.37 3458.8 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 25.65 27.95 27.80 18.35 27.66 
 
WORST CASE SCENARIO 
 
INDICATOR 
MINERAL TAXATION REGIME 
2008 2009 2012 2015 POST-2015 
Standard Deviation ($ Million) 352.92 819.64 827.89 247 836.13 
Mean NPV ($ Million) 1381.60 2939.02 2983.96 1183.83 3028.89 
Coefficient of Variation ($ Million) 25.54 27.89 27.74 20.87 27.61 
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Under both scenarios (i.e. worst and status quo), the 2015 taxation regime possesses the lowest risk to the 
government as reflected by low values of CV. This regime is followed by a sequential ranking of the 2008, Post-
2015, 2012 and 2009 taxation systems. This order of ranking is mirrored by the order of magnitude of CV 
values in Table 7. 
The following list provides a rationale for this ranking profile: 
• The 2015 mineral taxation system possesses the least risk to the Zambian Government because it is solely 
based on mineral royalty and at a higher rate (i.e. 20%);  
• The 2008 tax regime ranks second lowest in terms of government risk because it is mainly dominated by 
production based taxes (i.e. windfall tax and mineral royalty); 
• The Post-2015 taxation system ranks third because it has a higher royalty rate than the 2012 and 2009 
regime (i.e. 6%); 
• The 2012 regime ranks higher than the 2009 taxation system because the former has a higher royalty rate 
than the latter (i.e. 6%); and 
• The 2009 regime possesses the highest government risk because it has the lowest royalty rate (i.e. 3%).  
These results highlights that mineral royalty (i.e. ad valorem) minimizes the risk of revenue inflow into 
government coffers. 
e) Results of Investor Perception of Risk Test 
The investor’s perception of risk of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes was evaluated by analyzing the 
cumulative probability distribution of post-tax NPV discounted at 15% and 18%. Figure 4 shows the cumulative 
probability distribution of investor post-tax NPV of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes under the status quo and 
worst case scenario. 
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Figure 4: Results of investor perception of risk test 
Different values of post-tax NPV were generated by undertaking a series of price fluctuations. Therefore, this 
criterion assumes price to be the only source of uncertainty or risk. In Figure 4, under both scenarios, the 2008 
and 2015 regimes show a relatively low probability of expected positive outcomes and a high probability of 
expected negative outcomes. To the contrary, the 2009, 2012 and Post-2015 regimes which have coinciding 
graphs show a relatively low probability of expected negative outcomes and a high probability of expected 
positive outcomes. This directly signifies that the 2008 and 2015 regimes have a higher bearing on investor 
perception of risk when compared to the 2009, 2012 and Post-2015 taxation systems. Most investors are risk 
averse and thus prefer to reduce negative returns as much as possible. Assuming that the Lumwana mining 
investors are risk averse it is suffice to say that the 2015 taxation regime has a lower bearing on investor 
perception of risk than the 2008 regime. This is because the 2015 tax system offers a lower probability of 
expected negative outcomes (i.e. post-tax NPV) when compared to the 2008 regime. 
3.3. Ranking of Taxation Regimes 
Table 8 shows the ranking of Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes based on progressivity, revenue raising 
potential, neutrality, government risk and investor perception of risk. 
Table 8: Ranking of mineral taxation regimes 
 
EVALUATION 
CRITERION 
ZAMBIA’S MINERAL TAXATION REGIMES 
2008 2009 2012 2015 POST-2015 
Revenue raising potential 5 4 3 1 2 
Progressivity 4 1 1 5 1 
Neutrality 1 3 4 2 5 
Government risk 2 5 4 1 3 
Investor perception of risk 5 1 1 4 1 
Total ranking points 17 14 13 13 12 
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From Table 8, the Post-2015 taxation regime is the most robust based on the five evaluation criterions as 
reflected by the lowest ranking point. This is followed by a sequential ranking of the 2015 and 2012; 2009; and 
2008 regime. As can be deduced from Table 8, the aggregate ranking points entail that the Post-2015, 2015, 
2012 and 2009 taxation systems are relatively robust in design except the 2008 regime. This is because the latter 
has a weakly constructed tax structure that lacks proper harmonization of its taxation instruments. Similarly, the 
former taxation regimes are relatively robust because of the proper harmonization of their taxation instruments.  
However, it is imperative to be cognizant with the fact that there is a tradeoff among the five evaluation 
criterions. Thus, the most solid measures adopted in determining a robust mineral taxation regime depends on 
the taxation doctrine of the policy formulator and what is to be achieved. 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1. Conclusions 
The research results indicate that Zambia’s mineral taxation systems have different intensities of robustness 
based on the evaluation criterion that is employed. Thus, the most solid measures adopted in determining a 
robust mineral taxation regime depends on the taxation doctrine of the policy formulator and what is to be 
achieved. This research has shown that Zambia’s mineral taxation regimes based on the five evaluation 
criterions are relatively robust in capturing mining revenue except the 2008 regime. This is because of its weak 
tax structure that does not exhibit proper harmonization of its taxation instruments. The research has also 
reviewed that the current taxation system (i.e. Post-2015) is the most robust in design based on the five 
evaluation criterions. This has been attributed to the robust harmonization of taxes encapsulated in its tax 
structural design. The ranking of this taxation regime has been followed by a sequential ranking of the 2015 and 
2012; 2009; and 2008 taxation system. From these results, it can be deduced that it is not a single tax that affects 
a mineral fiscal regime but the lump sum of all the taxes and how they harmonize with each other. 
4.2. Recommendations 
The study recommends that the Zambian Government should review and optimize the current mineral taxation 
system (i.e. Post-2015). Additionally, it should optimize mining taxation based on all the taxation instruments 
encapsulated in the mining tax structure rather than achieve this cause by optimizing a single taxation 
instrument. This is because it is not a single tax that affects a mineral taxation regime but the lump sum of all 
taxes and how they harmonize with each other. Lastly, the government must increase the institutional capacity 
of ZRA so as to improve on administrative efficiency. Achieving this endeavor will help curb tax planning 
schemes such as transfer pricing, hedging manipulation, misreporting of grade and production values etc. 
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